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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers first-steps guidance towards the 
development of a methodology that embodies theoretical 
proposals for a fourth-wave, ‘entanglement’ approach to 
HCI. We propose the removal of technologies and the 
documenting of their absence as a method. Removal disrupts 
habitual relationships with our everyday technologies, 
revealing otherwise hidden knowledges. Removal as a 
method exemplifies that “you don’t know what you’ve got 
till it’s gone”. We apply removal to the case of menstrual 
cycle tracking in two ways: literally through two 
autoethnographies, and hypothetically through semi-
structured interviews. We show how this method especially 
facilitates emotional, embodied and cultural knowledge of 
the lived experience of self-tracking and we unpack some 
opportunities, implications and limitations in its use. Finally, 
we present how this method might be adopted by others and 
propose cases in which removal as a method might be 
applicable to study of a wider range of technologies beyond 
self-tracking.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As the field of self-tracking matures, it becomes necessary to 
reflect on how research on the self-tracking phenomenon is 
being conducted, and what impact our methods have on the 
knowledge we produce [29]. In recent years, qualitative and 
ethnographic methods have begun to replace more 
quantitative measures within the study of the self-tracking 
[1]. 
This shift in methods is driven by a shift in perspectives. 
From predominantly perceiving the user as a rational actor 
making informed decisions with the aim of self-
improvement, we now see the self-tracker as collecting 
personal informatics through “a range of lived activities” 
[51], without necessarily having a specific goal to achieve 
[17]. Once we move on from viewing self-tracking through 
the lens of optimization, we can address how self-tracking 
shapes lived experience [10]. This is challenging, however, 
because the body within self-tracking is both the focal point 
(object) as well as the medium of perception (subject) [12, 
27, 41, 59]. Indeed, self-tracking produces particular ways of 
being-in-the-world as we reflexively experience external 
information about ourselves. The status of the body as 
subject and object also has an impact on how we understand 
our own data. According to Lupton, this process is a “highly 
sensory experience” [38], one which involves negotiating 
and making sense of external sources of information in 
conjunction with bodily experience. This shift in perspective 
within research on self-tracking reflected the third wave of 
human-computer interaction (HCI) [6]. This wave prioritized 
phenomenological enquiries into the emotional and social 
effects of using technologies, rather than enquiries into 
functionality and usability [14, 15, 45].  
With our research, we support Frauenberger’s proposal that 
HCI is entering into a fourth wave of ‘entanglement HCI’ 
[22]. We not only support Frauenberger’s proposal, but also 
develop it by proposing the initial steps in the development 
of a method suitable for a fourth wave of HCI. According to 
Frauenberger, ‘entanglement theories’ such as post-
humanism, feminism, and post-phenomenology should be 
adopted and applied to the subject of science and 
technological innovation [2, 22]. This wave understands 
relations between humans and objects as producing realities 
through their intra-actions [2]. Knowledge is shown to be 
socially constructed, and objects are shown to be political 
actors. These theories all reject a positivist, Cartesian 
understanding that there is an external reality that can be 
conquered by the inquiring, cognitive mind. Frauenberger 
describes how HCI can be understood as having outgrown its 
epistemological and ontological commitments as it is 
“systematically struggling to keep up with what is 
empirically observed” [22]. Frauenberger proposes that as 
technologies literally became entangled in and with our 
bodies and everyday lives, what is empirically observed 
becomes less possible to understand and explain without the 
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use of entanglement theories; we have reached what Kuhn 
refers to as a “model crisis” [31].  
The fact that societal and technological developments mean 
that we are now never without our technological devices 
therefore makes a shift to a perspective on users and their 
devices as “entangled” relevant, particularly within the 
domain of self-tracking. The complex relationships between 
people and their data produce complex lived experiences. 
Approaches to understanding the lived experience of self-
tracking up to this point have included the active and passive 
collection of data that contextualizes users’ self-tracking 
practices [23, 62]. More traditional methods of self-reporting 
have been applied through autoethnographies, surveys and 
diary studies, for example [16, 50, 66]. While these methods 
can reveal some aspects of the sensorial and emotional 
effects of technologies on lived experience, we suggest that 
they are limited by the fact that once technologies have been 
enfolded and embedded in our lives, we are not good at 
understanding and articulating the particular ways they affect 
us. This is due to the fact that we are situated within these 
complex entanglements of our own data [37].  
In this paper we propose removal as a method – the deliberate 
removal of technologies and the documenting of their 
absence, in order to further research that aims to understand 
the lived experience of self-tracking. Following 
Frauenberger, we adopt ethico-onto-epistemological 
commitments. The theory of ‘embodied subjectivity’, 
derived from feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz, is 
employed to explore the effects of being without menstrual-
cycle tracking devices.  On the question of how subjectivity 
is produced, she proposes a theory of ‘embodied 
subjectivity’, especially as a way of countering dualist 
understandings of the cognitive mind and the mechanical 
body [24]. Grosz describes how selfhood is produced both 
through the specificities of the biological body as an object, 
e.g. sex, race, dis/ability, and the body as living subject, with 
social interactions and societal and cultural aspects shaping 
the subject’s sense of self. Grosz describes this relationship 
between the body as subject and the body as object as being 
like a mobius strip. The biological, material body can never 
be experienced “in the raw” but always through the lens of 
culture, and the particular biological body and anatomy that 
the self is experiencing the world through will influence how 
the world is perceived.  
This feminist theory combats societal understandings of the 
body as inferior to the cognitive mind, and thus the de-
valuation of those associated more closely with their bodies, 
such as women, labourers, those with disabilities, and non-
white people [24, 33, 48, 61]. In line with fourth-wave HCI, 
this is a move that rejects culture/material dualisms in how 
we attempt to understand use of technological devices [22]. 
Rather than seeing removal as a deletion of a device, as 
though it were possible to return to a state pre-use, or even 
reveal a “natural” body, we apply removal to disturb existing 
entanglements in order to produce knowledge about the 
particular ways in which we are entangled. To use Grosz’ 
theory; we use removal to disturb our mobius strips of 
selfhood [24].  
We use the method of removal in two autoethnographical 
accounts documenting the absence of menstrual cycle 
tracking apps. These accounts are supported by the reactions 
of eight current users of menstrual cycle tracking apps to the 
request to stop tracking. We find that removal as a method 
produces knowledge about the embodied, emotional and 
cultural factors shaping the lived experience of self-tracking. 
We reflect on the benefits and limitations of removal as a 
method and its relevance to other cases. We conclude with 
guidelines for when and where to apply removal as a method, 
and how to do it in four different ways.   
RELATED WORK  
Although it has not been articulated as such, removal has 
been a method employed by researchers within information 
studies and HCI in a number of ways.  
Cases of researchers using their own experience of removal 
as a research method include Science and Technology 
Studies researcher Phoebe Sengers’ experience of removing 
herself from her typical work and home environment whilst 
conducting fieldwork on the isolated Change Island in 
Newfoundland, Canada [55]. Sengers’ removed situation 
allowed her to reflect on her habitual relationships with work 
and time. This facilitated a critical stance that led to a change 
in everyday practices and wider societal reflections on how 
the design of software shapes “being modern”. Sengers uses 
these reflections to propose the design of technologies that 
help us create constraints on our choices in order to avoid 
overworking and the constant strain of decision making.  
Interaction-design researcher Andrés Lucero conducted an 
autoethnography of living without a mobile phone 
episodically over the span of nine years [35]. Lucero’s 
experience prompted him to reflect on the social factors that 
allowed him the freedom of not having a mobile phone over 
this time period. One example of this was the support of his 
immediate family; “If I was a single parent, I could not be 
constantly disconnected”. Another was how being isolated 
from the changing design of everyday technologies informed 
his work as a researcher – “allowed me to focus on 
developing ideas and improvements for mobile devices that 
were revolutionary in nature, and not constrained by the 
status quo”.  
In his 1990 book “The Age of Missing Information”, 
environmentalist Bill McKibben explores the effects of our 
society “moving steadily from natural sources of information 
toward electronic ones, from the mountain and the field 
toward the television.” [39]. McKibben juxtaposes his 
experience of spending 24 hours on a mountain top with 
watching 24 hours of recordings from each of his ninety-
three television channels, which he had his neighbours and 
friends record on VHS while he was up on the mountain. 
McKibben first removed himself from the technological 
world, then dived back into it, in an extreme way. Insights 
from this experience include how television places the 
viewer in the center; disconnected from the natural world and 
community, and from the detrimental impact this has on our 
sense of responsibility for the natural environment and 
climate change.  
More broadly within HCI, Satchell and Dourish [53] and 
Wyatt [67] give categories to different types of non-users. 
They discuss what can be gained from understanding why 
people do not use technological systems, whether this is 
through adopting and then abandoning them, or never using 
the system at all. Similarly, Baumer et al. [4] shows us how 
understanding non-use contributes to our awareness of 
appropriateness of use in specific contexts, and how non-use 
can be performative; such as an act of defiance akin to 
striking. Others within the field of psychology have studied 
the effects of stopping use of social media [63, 65].  
Within the field of self-tracking and personal informatics, 
there has been an increasing awareness of self-tracking 
practices as episodic. Episodic use includes lapsing of use, 
switching between devices, and abandonment [8, 18, 20, 32]. 
Though relevant, these examples differ from our proposed 
method as they address cases where self-tracking devices 
have been abandoned by choice of the users due to causes 
such as a change in lifestyle or dissatisfaction with the 
technology itself [8]. This fact thereby influences users’ 
reflections and attitudes, predominantly inasmuch as these 
users will reflect back on the device through a negative lens. 
Other research on episodic use has reported cases where self-
tracking technologies have trained users to a point where 
they become obsolete [18]. These examples point to the fact 
that self-tracked data does indeed have an after-life; lessons 
learnt from data collection do shape the future lives of self-
trackers. As Williams described after calorie counting and 
measuring his meals; “I can’t un-know the weight of things” 
[66]. In this paper, we aim to explore not only whether data 
shapes us after we stop self-tracking, but the qualities of how 
this information expresses itself within lived experience. As 
Kaziunas et al., describes it; “the dynamics of this livedness” 
of data [28]. We propose that, due to the entangled nature of 
interactions with self-tracking technologies, an 
entanglement, fourth-wave HCI method is required.  
REMOVAL AS A METHOD 
Interaction design is traditionally focused on the 
development or evaluation of new technologies, new 
constellations of existing technologies, or new contexts of 
use. Removal as a method is a qualitative method that is 
applied on an individual scale. This produces idiosyncratic 
accounts that allow situated knowledge to contribute to a 
wider understanding of how technologies shape lived 
experience [66]. Within interaction-design research, we 
often hear the call for more long term studies of users’ 
interactions with technologies [47, 64]. These studies 
attempt to understand how technologies are embedded in our 
lives over longer periods of time. We propose an alternative 
form of study that addresses long-term relationships with 
technologies without necessarily being a long-term study 
itself. 
Removal as a method - the deliberate removal of 
technologies and the documenting of their absences - 
provides a clear case of “you don’t know what you’ve got 
until it’s gone”. Once we have lived with technological 
artifacts for some time, use of them becomes habitual; 
interactions become automatic, and relationships and 
attitudes become embedded and invisible [30]. The fact that 
interactions and relationships become habitual affects users’ 
ability to reflect on the artifacts themselves and the role they 
play in their lives. We propose that this impacts user’s 
abilities to communicate these reflections to researchers 
conducting qualitative studies on these artifacts.  
Removal as a method represents a type of defamiliarization 
[3, 5]. Through removal, we are given a critical distance from 
the habitual that allows us to reflect on our interactions with 
technologies with fresh eyes. Removal disrupts the habitual. 
Anybody who has ever lost their mobile phone can relate to 
the fact that the loss of our everyday technologies makes our 
dependencies upon them evident. The outcomes of 
disruption can reveal otherwise hidden aspects of how the 
technologies we adopt in our daily lives shape us and our 
lived experience; both in the short term and in the long term.  
We applied removal as a method in three different ways:  
1. The imagined loss of the technological device 
before removal takes place. 
2. The immediate reaction to losing the technological 
device after removal. 
3. The adaptation to living without the technological 
device after removal in the long term. 
These three applications produce different types of results 
and findings to generate wider reflections on removal as a 
method and the nature of our entanglements with 
technologies.  
CASE STUDY: THE REMOVAL OF MENSTRUAL CYCLE 
TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES  
We have applied removal as a method both literally through 
two autoethnographic studies (one short-term and one long-
term), and hypothetically in semi-structured interviews with 
eight users of menstrual-cycle tracking technologies.  
Literal Removal as a Method 
During the autoethnographies the two first authors of this 
paper removed their menstrual cycle tracking apps from their 
lives. Autoethnographical methods used in the field of 
personal health technologies have been seen to allow 
researchers to carry out research in ways that could be not 
requested of research participants due to the heavy work load 
required; to value the subjective experience of the researcher 
as equal to that of other participants; and to use the collection 
of “idiosyncratic accounts” to evaluate the impact of 
personal devices on our lives [11, 46, 49, 66]. 
Autoethnographic removal as a method is the opposite of 
autobiographical design, where researchers adopt the 
technologies that they are designing in order to gain long-
term and personal insights for use in the design process [44]. 
Due to the fact that the first two authors menstruate and use 
menstrual cycle tracking technologies, and that our 
professions as fulltime academic researchers allow us the 
time and attention required for a full and rich 
autoethnographic study, we therefore qualified as suitable 
participants for the study. The fact that we are researchers 
also means that our knowledge of the field is deeper than the 
average user of menstrual-cycle tracking technologies, and 
that our accounts probably do not resemble those of the wider 
population. This reflexivity does not undermine the validity 
of these accounts, but rather positions them as expert 
accounts that include a greater depth of reflection and critical 
thinking.  
We entered our autoethnographic study with no expectations 
of how long it was to continue. Gaver warns that this type 
and level of engagement from researchers should only be 
conducted from a place of genuine interest or need, rather 
than for “research points” [44]. After one month, the second 
author (A2) left the study and returned to using Clue as she 
found the costs to her quality of life were too high. The first 
author (A1) continued the autoethnographic study in living 
without Clue for a further year and a half. To avoid 
autoethnographic note-taking acting as a form of menstrual 
cycle tracking, we refrained from recording fieldnotes until 
the end of each phase of removal; we both recorded 
fieldnotes after one month when A2 left the study, and A1 
recorded additional fieldnotes at the end of the year and a 
half. To prevent influencing one another’s experiences, we 
had no contact during the initial study. Reflections back on 
our individual experiences were recorded in separate 
documents and then compared and analyzed thematically by 
the first and second authors.  
Imagined Removal as a Method 
Users of menstrual cycle tracking apps were interviewed 
with the aim of recruiting them to participate in a study after 
seeing the value of removal as a method within our 
autoethnographies. This would have entailed them stopping 
their menstrual cycle tracking practices for a negotiable 
amount of time. Participants were aged between 22 and 37 
and located in Aarhus and Copenhagen, Denmark. During 
the semi-structured interviews, it became apparent that too 
few would be willing to give up their practice of tracking 
their menstrual cycle for the sake of our study for a diverse 
range of reasons. We will discuss the limitations of removal 
as a method in this respect below. This led to 
autoethnography being our sole literal application of removal 
as a method. However, reactions from our interview 
participants still signal the roles that menstrual-cycle 
tracking apps play in shaping lived experience.  
Asking the participants to remove their menstrual cycle 
tracking apps prompted them to put themselves into a 
fictitious scenario and predict the impact of this scenario 
practically and emotionally on their lives. We found that 
many predictions of the implications of stopping self-
tracking that were troubling and of concern to participants 
presented themselves within our autoethnographies.  
Menstrual Cycle Tracking Technologies 
In order to understand the implications of the removal of 
menstrual tracking technologies, it is important to understand 
more about the menstrual cycle tracking technology that was 
removed. Not all self-tracking technologies are designed 
with the same goals and there are different types of self-
tracking practice [42]. The goal for menstrual-cycle tracking 
is the act of tracking and documenting itself. Rooksby et al. 
describe this type of tracking as a form of “documentary 
tracking”, where there is no set goal in mind and tracking is 
seen to be done by people in order to “tell stories about 
themselves” [48: 1168]. Menstrual-cycle trackers are 
seeking self-knowledge and self-awareness rather than self-
improvement and optimization [19, 25].  
  
Figure 1. Screenshots from the Clue app showing the main 
page and the emotion logging page of the app.  
Menstrual cycle tracking apps use algorithms based on 
collected and self-reported data to predict and visualize the 
emotional and physiological state of the user at each stage of 
their menstrual cycle through written notifications or 
symbols (Figure 1.). Although certain menstrual cycle 
tracking apps have recently been approved as methods of 
contraception by the FDA [43], these technologies will not 
be discussed in this study.  
Both authors of this paper previously used a menstrual cycle 
tracking app called Clue. Clue is currently one of the most 
popular menstrual-cycle tracking apps in Western Europe 
with more than five million users worldwide [9]. Clue is not 
to be used as a form of contraception. Clue collects user-
reported data on factors such as length of menstruation, 
mood, sexual activity, exercise and alcohol intake (Figure 
1.). Users can decide what kind of information they want to 
track and Clue’s algorithm collects this data and uses it to 
predict future cycles; as stated on Clue’s website “The more 
you use Clue, the smarter it gets” [9].  
A1, aged 27 at the beginning of the study, had been using 
Clue for three years before this study began. Before Clue, she 
had not tracked her menstrual cycle digitally nor in an 
analogue calendar. A1 used Clue to track aspects such as 
heaviness and length of menstruation and for registering 
when she experienced PMS and increased libido during 
ovulation.  
A2, aged 40 at the beginning of the study, had also used Clue 
for three years before the study began and had tracked 
menstruation by marking the first day of menstruation in a 
calendar since her menstruation began. A2 used Clue to track 
heaviness and length of menstruation, pain (i.e. breast, 
cramps and headaches), the consistency of cervical mucus, 
and emotions and energy levels.  
FINDINGS 
We will now present some findings that resulted from our 
short and long-term autoethnographic applications of 
removal as a method, and reactions from our eight interview 
participants to the request to stop tracking.  
Gone but Not Forgotten 
Our autoethnographic study showed that once we had 
internalized menstrual cycle information, we did not need to 
access it again in order to interpret our physiological 
sensations. This information, (such as ovulation increasing 
libido, or PMS being experienced as depression or anxiety) 
remained in our memory and influenced our experience of 
our bodies. We continued to interpret our visceral sensations 
in relation to our memory of our previous menstrual cycles 
and the textual and graphical information and predictions of 
patterns Clue had provided us.  
During our interviews with our potential participants, many 
also predicted that they would not forget what they had learnt 
from their menstrual cycle tracking apps. P6 predicted that 
she had been tracking so long that she had learnt and 
internalized her menstrual cycle data, thereby possibly 
making the app obsolete. P2 also believed that she had 
internalized the information provided by the menstrual cycle 
tracking app. This led her to wonder whether it would be 
difficult to refrain from reading her felt experience of her 
menstrual cycle through the lens of the information she had 
previously been exposed to; “I think I would try to find this, 
like, knowledge of like “this is probably because, my, this 
hormone is going down” even if (the information about her 
menstrual cycle) is really difficult to remember”. P4 initially 
stated; “I’ve trained myself to analyze down how (inner 
sensations) fits with my hormones and my cycle”. However, 
after some moments pause, she wondered out loud whether 
removing her app would allow her to “just feel... things… 
how I actually feel it”. This shows that for P4, there is still a 
natural, unchanged, body beneath the act of tracking; she 
does not believe that her use of technologies changes her at 
a fundamental and ontological level.  
Returning to Bodily Sensations 
In our autoethnographies, we both found how, although we 
could remember enough to interpret our bodily sensations, 
losing the ability to track changed our experience of our 
bodies. During the first month after removal, A1 documented 
“I am hyper aware of every twinge of pain in my stomach as 
it gave me hope that my period would come soon” and A2 
stated “Hyper aware of my body. I believe I can describe 
every kind of cervical mucus my body delivers while I sleep”. 
When we discussed stopping menstrual cycle tracking with 
our participants, several predicted that their bodies and 
physical sensations would become more present to them after 
stopping their menstrual cycle tracking practices. P6 
considered that not using her app could prompt her to “think 
more about what's happening in my body”. Removal as a 
method provides a collection of examples of how 
technologies shape our felt experience of our bodies, even 
after they are removed. This shift in focus was uncomfortable 
and strange. As A2 stated “It has been a rare experience like 
being forced to use a muscle in your body that you normally 
don’t use (...) like putting away your glasses and forcing the 
eye to see by itself”. 
A1’s longer term experience revealed a shift from using 
information remembered from Clue to interpret sensations to 
having “embodied” the information. For A1, after a year and 
a half of interpreting sensations, a stage of reflection was no 
longer required in positioning felt sensations within the 
menstrual cycle; “I don’t feel something, then try to analyze 
it like I did at the start. The sensation and what that sensation 
means occurs to me at the same time”. With this 
development, the uncomfortable emotions around the stage 
of analysis where she felt “out of control” had faded into a 
“neutral awareness”. She still used the internalized 
information to read her bodily sensations, but she was more 
confident in her ability to do so.  
Losing Certainty 
Returning to felt sensations during the initial month after 
removal provoked negative emotions for us both. A1 
described experiencing “withdrawal symptoms” from her 
app. A1 later reported “When my period came, I felt a rush 
of relief. I was once again able to know for certain where I 
was in my menstrual cycle and regained control of my body”. 
One motivation behind the bodily “control” so desired and 
valued by us and our participants was the fear of not knowing 
when menstruation would begin. Not knowing left us in a 
state of being unprepared and without our usual 
paraphernalia to conceal our menstruation. A2 began 
carrying tampons everywhere from the first week of her 
cycle in order to avoid this happening.  
P3 self-reported as having mild obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and linked menstrual cycle tracking to preferring 
“to be more organized”. She thought that stopping tracking 
“would make me a bit more, uhh, maybe uncertain”. This 
theme of uncertainty was echoed by P4; “I would think it was 
a little bit bad (to stop tracking) (...) now I've been used to 
have some certainty or security even in some way”. P5 was 
overall relatively ambivalent about her dependency on the 
app, but still stated “it's very nice just to be able to look at”. 
P1 reacted to the proposal of stopping tracking by saying 
“that would be kind of horrible for me”. P1 then qualified 
this by stating that her app had an invaluable function for her; 
“oh I’m feeling this so I can input it here and if I go to the 
doctor I can remember exactly when and like what I was 
feeling”. However, as we continued the interview it became 
clear to P1 that her relationship with her app was not purely 
functional; “I mean, yes, I think I am a little too addicted to 
my phone so, like, it would be good if I wasn’t- because also 
this question you made right now made me think “wow, I’m 
really dependent on these apps, I should chill with that (...) I 
want to put more and more info, in a way I think to control 
my life. To have more control of what is going on with my 
body”.  
 
Figure 2. Screenshot from the A1’s app showing the lengths of 
previous menstrual cycles.   
At the end of the autoethnography A1 returned to her Clue 
app. She was surprised to find out just how irregular her 
cycles had been while she had been tracking her menstrual 
cycle (Figure 2). A1 had never consulted this information 
while using Clue. What she had taken to be accurate 
information and used as a guide to predict when her 
menstruation would begin was revealed as being built upon 
much more erratic data than she had expected.  
Troubling Subjectivity  
Once we had removed our menstrual cycle tracking app, we 
lost the ability to track and predict our hormones changing 
over chronological time. This prevented us from validating 
how we experienced the world through our menstrual cycle 
data. For example, we could remember that PMS happened 
on day 20 of the cycle, but we no longer knew when day 20 
occurred. This provoked negative emotions; “Losing track of 
time felt like losing track of me, losing control over my body” 
A2. P2 predicted that unlabeled and unexplained sensations 
would be deemed as “illogical”; “I think I would be trying to 
uhh, to give myself, or to find a logical explanation as to why 
I was a bit sore or why I was a bit emotional or why I was 
feeling very pumped and on”.  
Losing the ability to explain her subjective experience 
through her app was particularly distressing for A1 during 
the first month after removal. “I started doubting decisions I 
had made; am I feeling like this because I just moved in with 
my partner?... I asked my partner to check where I was in my 
cycle but not to tell me. I wanted him to know that this (PMS) 
wasn’t the real me, but just my hormones… but I felt as if he 
had some power over me. It felt unfair that he could 
understand my behavior when I couldn’t”. Over the 
following year and a half, however, A1 described taking a 
“less diagnostic, and more holistic approach”, to the 
question of whether or not her emotional experience was 
influenced by her hormones. Her “holistic” view allowed her 
to understand that her subjective experience of the world was 
influenced by her changing hormones, but that she would 
never really know what their influence was, and so was less 
keen to find a diagnosis.  
ANALYZING AND ARTICULATING OUR ENTANGLED 
FINDINGS WITH AN ENTANGLED THEORY 
In order to provide an example of what removal as a method 
can contribute, we will now analyze our findings through the 
lens of one example of what Frauenberger refers to as an 
entanglement theory [22]. As discussed, we support 
Frauenberger’s statement that, in order to avoid a model 
crisis, entanglement theories are required to understand 
findings about users’ entangled relations with technological 
devices [22, 31]. These theories argue that humans and their 
things are ontologically inseparable from the start. We will 
now show this in practice in order to analyze and further 
articulate our findings from removal as a method.  
A range of theories could be used to discuss the findings of 
removal as a method in different use cases and domains. In 
this particular case, feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz’s 
theory of embodied subjectivity is useful in unpacking how 
removal as a method provided access to the entangled nature 
of interactions between users and their technological device 
in the domain of menstrual-cycle tracking [24]. Although 
this is not an example of the theories given by Frauenberger, 
we deem it a relevant theory as it includes ontological, 
epistemological and ethical considerations. We have argued 
that removal as a method is a good method to understand 
entanglements and we will now use Grosz’s theory of 
subjectivity to articulate and analyze these entanglements.  
In her book ‘Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal 
Feminism’ Grosz firstly shows how, throughout history, 
philosophers’ conception of the “natural” and “universal” 
body has actually been the male body [24]. She states that 
this has led to the erasure of the female body and ignorance 
around how sexual specificity shapes subjectivity. For 
example, although phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty stated 
that the body is our mode of being in the world, he did not 
address how the differences between our bodies will produce 
different ways of being in the world, nor how the social 
standing of that body influenced its embodiment [40, 41]. To 
rectify this, Grosz contributes the theory of embodied 
subjectivity. Embodied subjectivity is a model of selfhood as 
a mobius-strip like relationship between the body as subject 
and the body as object. Grosz proposes that our experience 
of the world is shaped by the anatomical and physiological 
specificities of our bodies, and how we understand our 
anatomical and physiological body is shaped in turn by 
cultural and societal factors in turn. Grosz states that a 
neutral, natural, a-historical or pre-cultural body does not 
exist. Grosz’s mobius strip model describes the reality of our 
body as an entanglement of our flesh, bone, muscle and 
blood with the cultures and societies we are situated within. 
Grosz’s theory is particularly relevant to self-tracking, where 
the body as object is presented to the self-tracker through 
technological mediation. Since Grosz states that we can 
never experience our bodies “in the raw” [24], even our 
experience of our inner body is shaped by external factors. 
Grosz’s theory troubles the assumption that the self-tracker 
can neutrally discover their body through the use of self-
tracking devices. 
Removal as a method showed how using menstrual cycle 
tracking technologies fundamentally change how the body is 
understood, even after they these technologies are removed. 
From Grosz’s perspective, adopting menstrual cycle tracking 
technologies creates a different kind of embodied 
subjectivity than if menstrual-cycle tracking devices had 
never been employed, or if an analogue calendar had been 
used instead. We do not say that removing the Clue app from 
our lives allowed us to go back to the embodied subjectivity 
that we had before we adopted a menstrual-cycle tracking 
app, but rather we use the method to understand the 
particular ways in which Clue had shaped us.  
Internalized Epistemological Hierarchies  
Grosz’s theory highlights how epistemologies are always 
culturally contextual. Methods of enquiry are always shaped 
by cultural and societal values and biases. This means that 
the body can never be neutrally discovered through those 
methods of enquiry such as self-tracking technologies. This 
was exemplified by the fact that removal as a method showed 
how our menstrual cycle tracking apps had given us a sense 
of control and certainty about our bodies. To contextualize 
this mode of within cultural factors; gaining control and 
certainty over the unruly body through objectification is a 
key aim of Cartesian dualism. Descartes’ theory of the “self” 
being split into the cognitive mind and the irrational body is 
still evident today in how the body is understood and treated, 
especially within medicine and the way we design for and 
with the body [26, 33, 34]. Within this epistemology, 
subjective, felt knowledge about the body is devalued in 
favour of objective, rationalist scientific knowledge about 
biology and anatomy [60].  
The ways in which stopping tracking, and even the idea of 
stopping tracking, brought the body into “hyper awareness” 
and prompted uncomfortable and negative emotions, shed 
light on how self-tracking reflects epistemological 
hierarchies. Our study showed the extent to which we 
accepted and relied upon a scientific depiction of our bodies 
rather than our felt sensations. Once we had lost access to 
external sources of information about our bodies, we were 
forced to turn inwards and return to signs and signals coming 
from the insides of our bodies in order to know where we 
were within our menstrual cycles. Removal as a method 
revealed that our use of self-tracking technologies had made 
our felt, embodied experience strange. Removal revealed 
that we had outsourced the task of tracking our menstrual 
cycle to our technological devices. When we removed our 
devices, the task did not disappear. Rather, the task was 
delegated back to us, only this time with fewer resources and 
inferior tools, i.e. physiological sensations and bodily fluids 
rather than quantified data and predictive algorithms. 
This was exemplified when A1 returned to her Clue app and 
looked up her past data to find it was much more erratic than 
expected. The fact that she had not interrogated this 
collection of data when using the app reflects her 
unquestioning trust. She never felt she had cause to question 
that her menstrual cycles were perhaps not regular enough to 
produce meaningful predictions. This was despite the fact 
that she often found the predictions to be inaccurate, e.g. 
menstruation often took place up to a week after the 
predicted data. When her period was late it caused her to 
question her own menstrual health, or even worry that she 
was pregnant, rather than question the validity of the 
prediction. Irregularity was seen as being caused by the body 
rather than questioning whether her menstrual cycle was 
regular enough to make using apps such as Clue meaningful.   
Internalized Cultural and Societal Ethics and Values 
Our research shows how technologies reflect and perpetuate 
cultural ideals and taboos that then manifest in the lived 
experience and subjectivities of users. One aspect that was of 
concern to us and our participants was that we could no 
longer predict when our menstruation would begin. The 
female body is understood to be particularly “leaky”. 
Menstruation, childbirth and its changeable hormonal states 
mean that the female body lacks the control of the male body 
[57]. Grosz states that the body and lived experience of the 
body is socially constructed and shaped according to norms 
and taboos [24]. Grosz uses the contrasting examples of 
saliva and tears to show how bodily fluids are perceived 
through cultural norms [24]. For example, through our social 
conditioning we understand that it is not acceptable to 
publicly show menstrual blood [54, 58]. Amongst other 
things, menstrual cycle tracking apps are used to avoid public 
displays of menstrual blood, and therefore relate to cultural 
expectations of bodies as being controlled [25]. The prospect 
of socially disgracing ourselves through breaking social 
norms and taboos shaped our lived experience of our 
menstrual cycle as something uncontrolled and unruly. 
Although anxiety around the onset of menstruation can also 
relate to the possibility of pregnancy, were there no more 
taboo around publicly leaking menstrual blood than there is 
around sneezing, then knowing when menstruation would 
begin would not be such a large concern to those tracking 
their menstrual cycle.  
Our study showed how body politics around controlling 
unruly and leaky bodies had become internalized by users of 
menstrual cycle tracking technologies. This is Foucault’s 
ultimate definition of biopower; when disciplinary forces are 
adopted and enforced by the individual themselves [21]. This 
is a common critique of self-tracking technologies in terms 
of the individual maintaining fitness and health through 
adopting self-tracking technologies for the sake of the state 
[7, 36, 52]. Our study points to how the cultural and societal 
expectation of self-control is also enacted in the self-tracking 
of physiological processes such as menstrual cycles. This is 
in spite of the fact that these processes cannot be optimized 
or controlled by the user through tracking.  
Augmented Ontologies  
Removal as a method highlighted the different ontologies at 
play, both between us and our participants, as well as how 
our ontological understanding of ourselves changed after 
removal. For example, P4’s reflection that removing her 
menstrual cycle tracking app would allow her to “really feel” 
her body represents that she understands there to be an 
ontologically un-affected body beneath her use of her 
menstrual cycle tracking app. If she could remove the 
knowledge of her body that she has built from using her app, 
then she would be able to access her “natural” body.  
One way in which we and our participants had used 
menstrual cycle tracking apps was to allow us to reflect on 
how hormones influence how we experience the world [19]. 
Our own sense of self was augmented by our use of our apps. 
A1 felt that she was not “the real me” when she had PMS, 
and her app could be used to validate who she really was in 
relation to her hormones. As P2 predicted, she wanted a 
“logical” reason for her emotional experience. This provides 
a literal example of Grosz’s mobius strip in action; we used 
the external information from our menstrual cycle tracking 
apps in conjunction with our lived experience to form our 
understanding of ourselves. Our ontological understanding 
of ourselves was revealed to be a static self that morphed into 
something that was not “us” when we were influenced by our 
hormones. The menstrual cycle tracking app could be used 
to keep a hold of who we really were once we could account 
for our hormonal influences.  
Our menstrual cycle tracking apps had defined a logic for 
how and when PMS was to be experienced. Once our 
external data had been removed, the “PMS” phenomenon 
became blurred and illogical. It seeped into other aspects of 
life by making us unsure of the source of our emotions and 
undermined our own sense of rationality and self. This was 
exemplified by A1’s questioning of her decision to move in 
with her boyfriend. She looked to other parts of her life to 
validate her negative emotions.  
Over the year and a half that she lived without a menstrual-
cycle tracking app, A1’s negative reaction to losing Clue 
faded into a more holistic approach to her menstrual cycle. 
She still used the internalized information to read her bodily 
sensations to know where she was in her menstrual cycle, but 
she was more confident in her abilities, and so did not 
experience negative emotions of feelings of loss. She became 
more accepting of not having a certain reading of her body. 
One reason that this was acceptable for A1, but not 
acceptable for A2, was possibly that A1 had only begun 
tracking menstruation when she started using Clue for three 
years before the study began. A2 had been using a paper 
calendar to predict her menstruation since she had begun 
menstruating. A1’s embodied subjectivity had been changed 
by using Clue, but since it was a relatively recent change, 
perhaps she was more open to her reality of her menstrual 
cycle being an uncertain phenomenon. A1 could more easily 
accept an ontological understanding of herself as being in a 
state of change. Since she could no longer validate who she 
really was in relation to her PMS, then she took a more 
“holistic” view on herself as a changeable being.  
REFLECTING ON REMOVAL AS A METHOD 
As a method that supports Frauenberger’s call for the need 
for a conceptualization of a fourth wave, entanglement HCI, 
removal as a method facilitated insights into the particular 
ways in which users are entangled with their everyday 
technological devices. The research we have presented in 
this paper present the first tentative steps in the formation of 
this method. However, we see promise in it as an example of 
a fourth-wave approach to HCI that emphasizes the 
epistemological, ontological and ethical aspects of 
interactions with technologies. Using one such entanglement 
theory, Grosz’s theory of embodied subjectivity helped 
articulate and understand these entanglements in the case of 
self-tracking through the mobius strip model; the body as 
subject and object were in a constant state of becoming 
through and with one another.  
Removal as a method is appropriate for an entanglement HCI 
as it “serves to decentre the human as the sole source of 
activity and to elevate the role of the non-human world from 
a passive backdrop to human activity, to active contributors 
to relational action as it unfolds” [21]. To remove one 
physical artefact as a method seems at odds with the 
entanglement HCI perspective. Removal as a method might 
appear to be a solely subject-oriented method that focuses on 
the person, rather than a method that understands that 
realities, subjectivities, and agency is created through intra-
actions between people and objects [2, 22]. What removal 
showed, however, was the qualities with which relationships 
with objects become part of webbed entanglements, through 
which we experience and make meaning of the world. Not 
only do the findings from our use of removal as a method 
support Frauenberger’s call for the necessity of different 
conceptual perspectives in HCI in order to avoid a model 
crisis, but we also offer a humble proposal for how we might 
do entanglement HCI research in practice. Our research is 
driven by the question: shouldn’t our research methods adapt 
to new paradigms in HCI? Once we adopt the conceptual 
perspective that users are entangled in their interactions with 
devices, then we must question whether our research 
methods are adequate for understanding these 
entanglements.  
Removal as a method produced specific types of knowledge 
about the gaps that are left in webs of relations with our 
devices once they are removed. A1 and A2’s 
autoethnographic experiences of removal showed how their 
use of menstrual cycle tracking apps had irrevocably 
changed their ontological understanding of their bodies. 
Removal as a method revealed the dominance of scientific 
knowledge on the body, resulting in a sense of a “loss of 
control” when this scientific information was removed. 
Removal as a method highlighted these different ontological 
and epistemological perspectives, and the ethics behind these 
different ways of understanding the world. These findings 
particularly revealed how societal and cultural values and 
biases had been internalized and played out in our 
interactions with technologies. Not only are technologies 
designed with particular political and ethical worldviews, but 
how users employ and become with their technologies also 
reflects the society and culture they are situated within.  
The aim of employing removal as a method was not to 
dissuade participants from using menstrual cycle tracking 
apps, but P1’s reaction showed how even the question of 
removal allowed space for critical reflection. Removal as a 
method produced unexpected insights for P1; “this question 
you made right now made me think “wow, I’m really 
dependent on these apps, I should chill with that””. This was 
also evident in A1’s experience after returning to the app and 
discovering how irregular her data had been in the two years 
of using Clue. This undermined the validity of the app that 
had caused her unnecessary anxiety about her menstruation 
not starting on the predicted date. This shows how removal 
gives space for critical reflection on what we gain and what 
we want from our relationships from our technological 
devices.  
EXPANDING AND APPLYING REMOVAL AS A METHOD  
This paper presents the first steps in developing this method. 
Clearly, this method would have to be applied to many 
different cases before we could make generalized statements 
about its value, limitations and implications as a fourth-wave 
method. We believe that removal as a method could be 
applied to other cases to understand entanglements between 
users and other types of technological devices. We will now 
tentatively present where, when, and how removal as a 
method could be employed.  
Where to use the method 
In the case presented above we have applied removal as a 
method to self-tracking. Self-tracking devices are specific 
type of technologies, which, the method revealed, had strong 
influences on our emotions, our embodied experience, and 
social and cultural readings of the body. The method proved 
effective in uncovering some of these otherwise difficult 
aspects to get access to in studies of technologies. We see no 
reason to believe the method could not as easily be applied 
to other self-tracking technologies, or in fact any type of 
technological device. The type of device, the context of its 
use and the intention of the study would then dictate the types 
of knowledges produced. This was visible in how the 
existing examples of removal as a method we build upon 
produced different types of knowledge, e.g. Lucero’s study 
of his lack of a mobile phone [35], McKibben’s removal of 
information [39] and Sengers’ removal of her typical 
working environment [56].  
When to use the method 
Since removal as a method works by disrupting our habitual 
relationships with technological devices, the method requires 
users to have lived with the technology for long enough to 
have formed such habits in their everyday practice. What is 
classified as a habitual relationship is unclear, though it could 
be defined by frequency of use or how integral the device is 
to the life and activities of the user.  
When not to use the method  
It is clear that removal is not a method to be applied to novel 
technologies. This is because habitual relationships will not 
yet have been formed. Another obvious limitation applicable 
to the literal form of removal as a method is that this method 
is only relevant to non-vital cases of technology use. For 
example, asking somebody with diabetes to stop glucose 
monitoring could clearly lead to dire consequences.  
How to use the method   
Based on our preliminary work with the method this far and 
our reflections on the outcome, we see four ways of applying 
removal as a method.  
1. The first way would be to ask participants to imagine 
living without their device. Asking participants to stop using 
a technological artefact that they are happy using apparently 
crosses borders for some – five out of eight of the participants 
we interviewed declined to stop tracking for the sake of our 
case study. We found, however, that in cases where people 
decline to remove the technology from their lives for the sake 
of a study, their reactions to such requests still revealed 
important relationships and practices and are thus relevant in 
and of themselves. Indeed, throughout this paper, we have 
presented predictions from our participants about how they 
would react to removing their menstrual cycle tracking apps 
that very often accurately reflected A1 and A2’s experiences 
during the long-term and short-term autoethnographies. 
Interviews with those who decline could therefore form the 
initial stages of a larger study if not be a study in and by itself.  
2. A second form of removal as a method would be to 
conduct studies with those willing to literally remove the 
technology in hand. This could be set up as a diary study with 
in-depth interviews in the beginning and end and possibly 
during depending on the length of the study. This form was 
what we set out to do at first but have not tried in practice. 
The risk here, of course, is that the participants who would 
be willing to stop using the technology would be those with 
a less dependent or invested relationship with the technology 
compared to those who declined.  
3. A third option – a middle ground – could be designing the 
disruptions of the habitual as forms of restrictions. For 
example, rather than asking participants to stop using their 
mobile phones for a week, we could instead limit the amount 
of internet access they would have over that week. This 
would require them to limit their use to prioritize what they 
considered the most vital tasks in order to prolong their 
internet access. This would thereby produce knowledge on 
their unrestricted and habitual use of their mobile phones by 
revealing what tasks and applications they prioritized when 
their use was limited. As McKibben writes at the end of his 
account of living with, and without, television; “we can’t go 
live in the woods by a lake – but we can go there long enough 
to listen, to hear.” [39].  
4. A fourth option is the autoethnographic version of 
removal. Within this category, we applied the method in two 
ways, a short term, one-month long autoethnography, and a 
longer-term autoethnography spanning one-and-a-half years. 
These two versions address two distinct stages of removal. 
The short term reveals the immediate reaction to removal; 
where lack and absence is highlighted. A longer-term 
removal shows how we negate and work around absence, and 
what the aspects that we do and do not miss tell us about our 
habitual use of technologies. As discussed above, 
particularly in the case of self-tracking, use of technological 
devices produces particular ways of being-in-the-world. A 
degree of reflexive attentiveness is required to mark the 
various ways in which technologies shape this being-in-the-
world. Researchers can afford this reflexive attentiveness in 
ways that could not be asked of research participants [35, 
66]. However, it must be considered that since researchers 
will typically be experts in the field of the technology being 
removed, their account will not resemble that of the wider 
population. The accounts produced through these 
autoethnographies are to be treated as particular rather than 
as generalizable experience.  
Finally, an important aspect of how to use the method is how 
to set up data collection. Overall, we recommend typical 
autoethnographic tools such as keeping reflective field notes 
[13]. The design of these methods would depend on the 
individual study. One curious implication with our particular 
application of removal as a method was the fact that when it 
comes to the removal of self-tracking tools, including mood 
tracking and journaling technologies, there are some 
considerations to be made around how to document the 
absence of the technology. In these cases, the act of keeping 
autoethnographic notes risks replacing the technology that is 
being removed. For example, had we recorded every day of 
our lives without our menstrual cycle tracking technologies, 
we would have ended up documenting our menstrual cycles. 
Rather than documenting removal, this would have merely 
replaced the technology being removed. This was our 
motivation behind our only recording fieldnotes at the end of 
the autoethnographic studies. Although this can be seen as a 
limitation in the context of typical autoethnographic 
practices, we also see benefits in allowing the loss of 
technological devices to become a background event. Just as 
long-term deployments of designed artefacts are used with 
the intention that the devices will fade into the background 
of user’s lives over time [64], so should the absence of 
devices also move beyond novelty and conscious awareness 
during long-term applications of removal as a method. 
Therefore, we recommend that this be considered in the 
collection of data derived from removal as a method with all 
types of technological devices..  
CONCLUSION 
This paper marks only the beginning of exploring the 
qualities of removal as a method. With this paper, we both 
support and develop proposals for a fourth-wave, 
entanglement, HCI. Frauenberger proposes that we have 
reached a model crisis, where current conceptual 
understandings and practices are no longer able to account 
for our relationships with technologies as they become 
increasingly intertwined with our bodies and lives in general. 
To this shift in paradigm, we contribute a method as an 
answer to the question; how might we do entanglement HCI 
in practice? Shouldn’t our research methods be updated in 
line with new paradigms in HCI? We propose the deliberate 
removal of technologies and the documentation of their 
absence with the belief that this disrupts habitual 
relationships with our everyday devices. We applied removal 
as a method to the case of menstrual-cycle tracking in two 
ways: literally through two autoethnographies, and 
hypothetically through eight semi-structured interviews. The 
disruption of habitual relationships with technologies 
revealed aspects of how we are epistemologically, 
ontologically and ethically entangled with our everyday 
devices. This knowledge helped us understand the lived 
experience of menstrual cycle tracking. We have proposed 
that removal as a method is applicable to enquiry into other 
cases of technology use and have presented here some of its 
opportunities and limitations.  
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